Making Sense of Moral Perception

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  • Rafe McGregor
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)745-758
Number of pages14
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Volume18
Issue number4
Early online date1 May 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Aug 2015

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Francis Hutcheson’s moral sense theory offers a satisfactory account of moral perception. I introduce Hutcheson’s work in §1 and indicate why the existence of a sixth sense is not implausible. I provide a summary of Robert Cowan and Robert Audi’s respective theories of evaluative perception in §2, identifying three problematic objections: the Directness Objection to Cowan’s ethical perception and the aesthetic and perceptual model objections to Audi’s moral perception. §3 examines Hutcheson’s moral sense theory, focusing on his discussion of benevolence, the desire for the happiness of others. I deal with the unresolved issues in Hutcheson’s account by recourse to Charles Darwin’s evolutionary perspective on the moral sense in §4, arguing for the moral sense as the second-order faculty for judging benevolence. I return, in §5, to the objections, showing that moral sense theory solves all three problems and therefore offers a satisfactory account of moral perception.

    Research areas

  • Charles Darwin, Francis Hutcheson, Moral perception, Moral sense theory, Sensory modalities

Documents

  • McGregor_Making_Sense_of_Moral_Perception

    Rights statement: © 2015, Springer Verlag. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self- archiving policy. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9601-9

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External organisations

  • University of York

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