Hume and Wittgenstein: the risk of reasoning religion into superstition

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Abstract

Hume argues that Christianity would be a superstitious delusion if it were based on the testimonial evidence that Christ performed miracles. Wittgenstein argues that those who base religious belief on evidence are ‘ridiculous’ and that evidence turns religion into ‘superstition’. Despite appearing to undermine Christianity, I argue that Hume and Wittgenstein defend Christianity from being undermined when read in their philosophical context. Their philosophical context aims to show what Christianity is like, and they show that Christianity would be a superstitious delusion if it were based upon evidential reasoning. Therefore, if we think Christianity is not a superstitious delusion then we should think it has its basis in something else. Hume calls this something else ‘faith’ but doesn’t tell us much about it nor what miracles do for it. Wittgenstein, however, does. Wittgenstein’s views on religious belief, faith and miracles map Hume’s and offer insight into Christian life. Read in this way, both philosophers remind us that Christ came to save souls through faith, not minds through reason.
Original languageEnglish
JournalBelgrade Philosophical Annual
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2 Nov 2024
EventScience, Faith & Superstition - The University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
Duration: 27 Jun 202429 Jun 2024
http://www.scifas.org/scifas-conference.html

Keywords

  • Wittgenstein
  • Hume
  • Miracles
  • evidence
  • belief
  • religion
  • philosophy of religion
  • epistemology
  • faith
  • fideism
  • theology
  • Early Modern Philosophy

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