Hume and Wittgenstein: the risk of reasoning religion into superstition

The view that we should proportion belief to evidence picked up pace during the early modern period and had become dominant by the turn of the 20th century. A key philosopher from each period – Hume and Wittgenstein – applied this to Christianity to devastating effect. Hume argues that if Christianity is based on the testimonial evidence that Christ performed miracles, then Christianity falls victim to his ‘everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusions’. In his later work, Wittgenstein explains ‘if there were evidence, this would in fact destroy the whole business’ and brands those who believe because of evidence ‘ridiculous’ and warns that they turn religion into ‘superstition’. This seems to be a devastating attack which, if successful, renders Christianity irrational and Christians delusional.
In this paper, I argue that a different interpretation is available when their arguments are contextualised in their broader philosophical projects. Hume and Wittgenstein do not always try to prove or disprove the existence of God but instead perform investigations and ask probing questions to get a clearer presentation of what religion is really like. In this context, Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s arguments do not prove that Christianity is a superstitious delusion but show that Christianity cannot be based on evidence because if it were then it would be something it isn’t – a superstitious delusion. Yet while Hume concludes that his check proves Christianity is not based on evidence but faith, he does not explain what faith is nor how it develops beliefs. Wittgenstein’s work on religious belief maps Hume’s and provides a potential explanation for what faith is and how it develops beliefs. I conclude that Hume and Wittgenstein advise against basing Christianity on evidence rather than faith and they outline how Christians can embrace this.