Can atheists play along? Wittgensteinian challenges to religious fictionalism

All atheists think that the central claims of religion are false, but not all atheists think that religion is useless. Some believe that, despite its falsehood, religious language and rituals are pragmatically valuable because they lead to goods worth getting. However, it is not easy for an atheist to engage in religion to obtain these goods because they can feel intellectually or morally insincere in saying and doing things they consider false or faulty. Religious fictionalism aims to address this by claiming that atheists can take part as they would in a fictional game of make-believe, and as they do so knowingly, they do so sincerely. We examine religious fictionalism from a Wittgensteinian perspective, which holds religious language as not in the business of asserting factual beliefs and religious rituals as not methods for achieving things. This leads to two challenges that indicate prima facie incompatibility between Wittgenstein and religious fictionalism: religious fictionalists are usually presented as atheists who think religious beliefs are false and are motivated to participate in religion because they believe it remains useful. We conclude with some responses to each challenge, showing that hermeneutic fictionalism is the most promising form of fictionalism from a Wittgensteinian view.