Between knowledge and certainty: the grammatical duality in Wittgenstein's view of religious belief

Pichler and Sunday Grève have recently argued that Wittgenstein took a dual approach of cognitivism and moderate non-cognitivism towards religious belief. I reply that this does not fully capture Wittgenstein’s view because it overlooks his understanding of the grammar of truth and belief in religion. Wittgenstein thinks the meaning of truth and belief is relative to the language game and form of life in which they are found, and he distinguishes claims that can be doubted (knowledge) from those that are immune to doubt (certainties). I argue that the grammar of truth and belief differ for knowledge and certainty and that Wittgenstein classed religious belief as the latter. However, a statement that expresses knowledge in one context can express certainty in another, and it is not always obvious which context the statement is in nor whether the two can be separated. For this reason, the same statement can be read following either grammar and appears to have cognitive and non-cognitive qualities. I conclude that identifying the duality in Wittgenstein’s view as grammatical captures many of Pichler and Sunday Grève’s views while offering a more nuanced account of Wittgenstein’s.